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Alice Woolley* "Uncivil by too much civility"?: Critiquing
Five More Years of Civility Regulation
in Canada'
The author revisits criticisms of the civility movement made in an earlier paper
("Does Civility Matter?" (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall LJ 175). She argues that
Canadian law societies remain concerned with lawyer incivility, despite bringing
surprisingly few formal prosecutions against lawyers for incivility. In a few cases
the law societies' concern can be justified insofar as lawyer incivility in those
cases appears to correlate with serious professional dysfunction. Generally
however, the focus on incivility is counter-productive. First, in several cases the
focus on lawyer incivility elides the complex and difficult ethical issues raised by
the behaviour of the lawyers in question. Disciplining lawyers for incivility when
their conduct was substantively unethical avoids consideration of precisely why
their conduct was improper, and ignores the implications of that analysis for the
ethical duties of lawyers more generally. Second, the civility movement envisages
a narrow conception of the "good lawyer" and risks reifying a patrician model of
advocacy Finally, civility regulation has the potential to chill proper advocacy
particularly for vulnerable clients. Law societies who discipline lawyers for making
the right argument in words that were poorly chosen discourage what they ought
to encourage.
L'auteure revient sur les critiques du mouvement en faveur de la civilite faites dans
un article pr6cddent ( Does Civility Matter? - (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall LJ 175).
Elle allgue que les barreaux canadiens continuent de s'inqui6ter du manque
de civilite chez les avocats, m~me si, 6tonnamment, ils n'intentent que peu de
poursuites contre des avocats pour manque de civilit6. Dans un petit nombre
de cas, les prdoccupations du barreau peuvent se justifier dans la mesure oei
le manque de civilit6 des avocats semble 6tre lid j un grave dysfonctionnement
professionnel. En rbgle generale, toutefois, I'accent mis sur le manque de civilit6
est contre-productif. En premier lieu, dans de nombreux cas, la focalisation sur
le manque de civilit6 des avocats laisse dans lombre les difficiles et complexes
questions d'ordre 6thique soulev~es par leur comportement. Le fait d'imposer
des mesures disciplinaires & des avocats parce que leur conduite 6tait contraire
6 l'dthique contourne la question de savoir en quoi exactement leur conduite 6tait
r6pr6hensible, et laisse de cct6 les implications de cette analyse concernant les
obligations 6thiques g~ndrales des avocats. En deuxibme lieu, le mouvement
en faveur de la civilit6 prdconise une conception 6troite du < bon avocat - et
risque de rdifier un moddle patricien de d6fense des int6r~ts. Enfin, un r~glement
en matibre de civilit6 pourrait faire planer un froid sur la d~fense des intar~ts,
particulibrement pour les clients vuln6rables. Lorsqu'ils imposent des mesures
disciplinaires 6 des avocats pour avoir avancd le bon argument avec des mots
mal choisis, les barreaux d6couragent ce qu'ils devraient plutdt encourager.
* Professor of Law and Director of Admissions, Faculty of Law, University of Calgary.
1. "I have often seen people uncivil by too much civility, and tiresome in their courtesy": Michel
de Montaigne, "Ceremony at meetings between kings" in The Essays (Les Essais) (Bordeaux: Simon
Millanges, 1580) bk I, ch 8. I am grateful to Earl Cherniak, Adam Dodek, Amy Salyzyn, and David
Tanovich for their helpful comments on this paper.




III. Obscuring the real problems
IV. Expressive differences
V. Creating the wrong incentives
Conclusion
Introduction
The legal profession still cares about civility. 2 In his July 2012 opening
remarks to the 5th Biennial International Legal Ethics Conference,3 the
President of the Canadian Federation of Law Societies argued for the
centrality of civility as a moral virtue for lawyers, and defended the
regulatory attention paid to civility by the Canadian law societies that
constitute the Federation's membership. The year also saw the Law
Society of Upper Canada decide that Joe Groia was guilty of professional
misconduct because of his incivility to opposing counsel during his
successful defence of John Felderhof from insider trading and securities
charges.' And the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the Barreau du
Qu6bec's decision that Gilles Dord was guilty of professional misconduct
because of an uncivil letter he wrote to a judge.'
2. For my earlier discussion of civility regulation see Alice Woolley, "Does Civility Matter?"
(2008) 46 Osgoode Hall LJ 175 [Woolley, "Does Civility Matter"].
3. Address given in Banff, Alberta, July 2012, online: <http://www.ucalgary.ca/ilec5/>.
4. Law Society of Upper Canada v Joseph Peter Paul Groia, 2012 ONLSHP 0094 [Groia]. I
appeared as an expert witness on behalf of Mr. Groia.
5. Dord v Barreau du Qudbec, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 SCR 395 [Dore].
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A paper I wrote five years ago challenged the regulatory attention paid
to civility.' It did so on two grounds. First, it argued that to the extent
civility regulation is directed solely at lawyer rudeness, and in particular
at lawyers who impolitely express legitimate positions or who criticize the
conduct of other lawyers, that regulation has the capacity to undermine
lawyer zeal and the self-regulation of the profession. Both zeal and self-
regulation require that lawyers act fearlessly and take stands that may
generate backlash from those the lawyers offend; civility regulation risks
inhibiting lawyers' willingness to do so.' Identifying when rudeness
reaches the point of professional misconduct is also susceptible to undue
subjectivity, with the assessment of impropriety (colourful or uncivil?)
tending to lie in the eye of the beholder.!
Second, I argued that to the extent civility regulation is directed at
conduct that is substantively unethical-i.e., that would be unethical no
matter how politely it was done, such as harassment of a witness during
cross-examination-the focus on civility distracts attention from the real
ethical questions raised by such conduct. At what point, for example,
does cross-examination shift from a legitimate challenge to a witness's
credibility and to the authenticity of her story, to becoming unethical
harassment? Condemning the lawyer's rudeness speaks to that question
only indirectly, and not especially helpfully, since the line between
legitimate and illegitimate cross-examination can be crossed no matter
how polite the lawyer's tone and demeanor.'
This comment reconsiders and assesses those positions in light of the
civility cases released since 2007, including the high profile cases of Groia,
Dore, and Kevin Murphy, the lawyer whose conduct as defence counsel to
6. Woolley, "Does Civility Matter," supra note 2. For an excellent overview of the regulation of
civility in the United States see Donald E Campbell, "Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to be Civil:
Defining Civility as an Obligation of Professional Responsibility" (2011/2012) 47 Gonz L Rev 99.
Campbell does not take a position on the virtues of civility regulation: "the justification for adopting
these codes may be questioned," at 145. Rather, he emphasizes that effective and appropriate civility
regulation requires a proper understanding of what civility means. For arguments in support of civility
regulation see Judith D Fischer, "Incivility in Lawyers' Writing: Judicial Handling of Rambo Run
Amok" (2011) 50 Washburn LJ 365; Christopher J Piazzola, "Ethical Versus Procedural Approaches
to Civility: Why Ethics 2000 Should have Adopted a Civility Rule" (2003) 74 U Colo L Rev 1197.
For a view more in line with the opinions expressed here see Harry Cohen, "Lawyer Certification,
Civility, 'Good Moral Character' and Pressures for Conformity" (2001) 25 J Legal Prof 101 (originally
published in 1976). Cohen suggests that "[a]lthough the proponents of more certification and more
civility may be shocked by the thought, their increasingly stringent demands are actually part of a large
scale effort toward the invasions of privacy and harassment of those who disagree with governmental
trends, either toward 'equalitarian uniformity' or in the direction of other kinds of despotism," at 104.
7. Woolley, "Does Civility Matter," supra note 2 at 179-183.
8. Ibid at 182-183.
9. Ibid at 184-187.
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Julia Elliott played a part in ending the judicial career of Paul Cosgrove."o
It begins with the observation that despite the law societies' rhetorical
commitment to civility, and the high profile cases just noted, formal civility
proceedings have played a surprisingly minor role in formal regulatory
governance of Canadian lawyers. There are only a handful of disciplinary
decisions reported since 2007 and, with the exception of Dore, all of those
decisions come out of Ontario and British Columbia. In most Canadian
jurisdictions there were no published disciplinary decisions addressing
lawyer incivility. Because of the publicity received by the cases, and the
use of informal regulatory mechanisms to govern civility, the lack of
formal proceedings does not significantly ameliorate the negative effects
of civility discipline. It is nonetheless somewhat unexpected given the
rhetorical emphasis placed on civility by the law societies.
More significantly, the reported cases suggest that in some instances
lawyer incivility is a red flag allowing regulators to identify lawyers whose
legal practices generally violate ethical and legal standards. Lawyers who
routinely and consistently act with rudeness and incivility towards others
may be at higher risk of different sorts of professional misconduct; their
incivility, and regulators' concern with it, may help regulators address
expeditiously their more substantive misconduct. This suggests a more
productive role for civility regulation than was apparent from my prior
review of the cases.
Having said that, a number of the cases reinforce the concerns with
civility regulation identified in the earlier paper. In particular, Dord and
Murphy show how the focus on civility elides the complex and difficult
ethical issues raised by the behaviour of the lawyers in those cases.
Disciplining lawyers for incivility when their conduct was substantively
unethical avoids consideration of precisely why their conduct was
improper, and ignores the implications of that analysis for the ethical duties
of lawyers in general." One of the cases, Law Society of Upper Canada v
Guiste,12 highlights the narrow conception of the "good lawyer" that the
civility movement envisages, and the risk that it reifies a patrician model
of advocacy. Finally, Groia, and the Law Society of British Columbia
decision regarding Kelowna lawyer Gerry Laarakker," highlight the
10. Law Society of Upper Canada v Kevin Mark Murphy, 2010 ONLSHP 0023 [Murphy].
11. This is also the case with Law Society ofBritish Columbia v Lanning, 2008 LSBC 31 [Lanning];
and 2009 LSBC 2; and Law Society of Upper Canada v Ludmer, 2012 ONLSHP 191 [Ludmer]. See
text accompanying note 48.
12. Law Society of Upper Canada v Guiste, 2011 ONLSHP 24 [Guiste]; and 2011 ONLSHP 0129
[Guiste 2011].
13. Law Society ofBritish Columbia v Laarakker, 2011 LSBC 29 [Laarakker]; and 2012 LSBC 2.
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earlier noted danger of civility regulation to zealous advocacy and lawyer
self-regulation. Law societies who discipline lawyers who made the right
argument1 4 in words that were poorly chosen, discourage what they ought
to encourage.
I. The numbers
As noted, civility matters to Canadian legal regulators. In a 2011 Discipline
Advisory, the Law Society of British Columbia noted that rudeness and
incivility are common grounds for complaints about lawyers." It and
the Law Society of Upper Canada continue to express concern about the
absence of civility in the profession, and to emphasize civility's importance
in legal practice.' 6 The Law Society of Upper Canada in 2009 initiated the
Civility Complaints Protocol under which judges may refer incidents of
unprofessionalism "such as incivility" to the Law Society. Judges have
always had the power to raise issues with a lawyer's conduct to a law
society, but the point of the Protocol is to encourage them to exercise it.
Under the Protocol the Law Society of Upper Canada will not initiate
disciplinary proceedings in response to judicial complaints, but will have
a mentor meet with the lawyer "to discuss the conduct in question and
assist in his or her development as an advocate.""
Given that regulators view incivility as professional misconduct, that
incivility is commonly asserted to be a serious problem in the profession,II
and that incivility is said to be a major source of complaints to law
societies,' 9 one would expect incivility to also form a significant part of
the disciplinary agenda of the various provincial law societies. That is, one
would expect the regulatory focus on civility to translate into discipline of
lawyers for incivility. Yet a review of the disciplinary record from 2007
14. By which I do not mean a successful argument; lawyers have an ethical obligation to make the
best argument for their client even if that argument has only a limited chance of success. In some
cases the "right" argument will be an argument more likely than not to fail (e.g., where an argument
is necessary to preserve rights on appeal). The Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Code of
Professional Conduct, Ottawa: FLSC, 2012, Rule 4.01(1) and Commentary.
15. Law Society of British Columbia, "Lack of Civility Can Lead to Discipline" (10 June 2011),
online: <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/page.cfmi?cid=2220> [LSBC, "Lack of Civility"].
16. See, for example, Law Society of Upper Canada, "For the Record: Civility" (8 August 2011),
online: <http://www.1suc.on.ca/with.aspx?id-2147486422>; Ontario Bar Association, "Law Society
Treasurer Proposes Civility Measures" (27 May 2010), online: <http://www.oba.org/en/main/home
en/Newsdetails.aspx?no-NEWS05272010-1857-IE>.
17. Law Society of Upper Canada, News Release, "Civility Complaints Protocol" (24 September
2009), online: <http://www.1suc.on.ca/media/sept2409 civilityprotocol-nr.pdf>.
18. See, e.g., Law Society of Upper Canada, "Civility: A Cornerstone of Professionalism," Ontario
Lawyers Gazette (Winter 2008), online: <http://www.1suc.on.calmedia/olgwinter08_professionalism.
pdf> at 5-10.
19. LSBC, "Lack of Civility," supra note 15.
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through 2012 does not confirm that expectation. In that period there were
only ten disciplinary decisions addressing civility from the English speaking
law societies plus the Dord decision out of Qu6bec. 2 0 A review of the sixty
reported disciplinary decisions from 2009 for the law societies of British
Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Nova Scotia identified
only one decision addressing incivility.21 That contrasts to, from the same
sixty-case sample, nine cases dealing with lawyer misappropriation of
trust funds, fourteen cases arising from a lawyer's failure to respond to
lawyers, clients, or the law society, and eighteen cases addressing a lawyer
who misled or deceived a third party, regulator, the court, another lawyer,
or the law society.2 2 For those law societies in 2009, civility issues arose in
very few cases, both absolutely and relatively.
This relative paucity of disciplinary attention could be used to argue
that the civility movement is more aspirational than regulatory, that
the exhortation of lawyers to be civil is an attempt to bolster a better
professional culture through encouragement rather than sanction. If that
were truly the case the problems with the civility movement would be
ameliorated, since a purely aspirational model is less likely to create
negative incentives or to conflict irreconcilably with the lawyer's other
duties. The weakness with that argument, however, is that it does not take
many cases to create a reaction of caution or fear. The existence of at
least three high profile civility cases in the past few years (Murphy, Groia,
and Dord), and one case which received at least some media attention
(Laarakker23), means that Canadian lawyers are well aware that incivility
may lead to disciplinary consequences.2 4 Indeed, the Law Society of British
Columbia said just that-"Lack of Civility Can Lead to Discipline"-in a
20. This is based on research of the CanLIl and Quicklaw databases. In addition to the cases cited
earlier see: Law Society of Upper Canada v Townley-Smith, 2012 ONLSHP 52 [Townley-Smith]; Law
Society of Upper Canada v Lyle, 2010 ONLSHP 40 and 2011 ONLSHP 34 [Lyle]; Law Society of
Upper Canada v Ranieri, 2009 ONLSHP 0068 [Ranieri 2009]; and 2011 ONLSHP 0094 [Ranieri
2011].
21. My recollection is that in fact only one decision addressed incivility-Lanning, supra note 11;
however, in my paper I list incivility as amongst various topics that had between one and three cases
dealing with them. See: Alice Woolley, "Regulation in Practice: the 'ethical economy' of lawyer
regulation in Canada and a case study in lawyer deviance" (2012) 15 Legal Ethics (forthcoming).
22. Ibid at 247-248.
23. Michael McKiernan, "BC Lawyer fined $1500 for outburst at Ontario colleague," Canadian
Lawyer Mag (18 January 2012), online: <http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/legalfeeds/658/B.C.-
lawyer-fined-$1500-for-outburst-at-Ontario-colleague.html>.
24. Note also the recent headline about the disbarment of Kimberly Townley-Smith who, as
discussed below, was primarily disciplined for substantive ethical misbehaviour: Glenn Kauth, "Law
Society sends message to lawyers who attack judges," Law Times (29 October 2012), online: <http://
www.lawtimesnews.com/201210299402/Headline-News/LSUC-sends-message-to-lawyers-who-
attack-judges>.
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2011 publication. It is likely that far more lawyers know that lawyers have
been disciplined for incivility than know that the number of the lawyers
who have been is small. In addition, in Ontario and British Columbia there
have been formal proceedings taken against lawyers on a regular basis,
even if not a frequent one. Moreover, law societies have the capacity
to regulate lawyers through informal as well as formal mechanisms. In
Ontario, for example, lawyers subject to a complaint by a judge through
the Complaints Protocol will be asked to undertake "mentoring" from
the Law Society of Upper Canada. In addition, the Law Society of Upper
Canada may issue an "Invitation to Attend" which requires the lawyer
who receives it to meet with senior benchers to be advised that his or her
conduct was not acceptable. These informal mechanisms reinforce and
enhance the chilling effect of formal disciplinary proceedings.
Consider in particular the Complaints Protocol. There are no articulated
standards to govern when a judge reports misconduct to the law society.25
The complaint must detail the misconduct, but there is no standard defining
what, for example, should be considered incivility warranting complaint.
In addition, while the complaint does not formally result in sanctions
being imposed on the lawyer, it does create ongoing issues for the lawyer's
practice. If a judge has brought a complaint against a lawyer, the lawyer
conceivably has a duty to disclose the past complaint to a client in the
event the lawyer needs to appear before the complaining judge on the
client's behalf. That lawyer-and her client-may legitimately question
the ability of the lawyer to receive a fair hearing from the judge; in
particular, they may question the lawyer's ability to advocate zealously for
the client knowing that the judge has viewed the lawyer's past advocacy
as uncivil. This concern may be exacerbated to the extent that the Law
Society views the complaint as frivolous or the incivility as reasonably
provoked by improper conduct on the part of the judge; the lawyer may be
concerned that the judge will resent the Law Society's position and take it
out on the lawyer or her client in the subsequent matter. In short, the lack
of an articulated standard of behaviour and the negative consequences for
her practice may lead the reasonable lawyer to modify the intensity of her
advocacy to avoid a judicial complaint of incivility, even if that complaint
could not result in disciplinary proceedings.
It is difficult, then, to make confident assertions about how the
disciplinary approach taken by the law societies affects the impact of the
civility movement. Outside of Ontario and British Columbia it may be
25. See, e.g., Civility Complaints Protocol, "Protocol for the Superior Court of Justice," online: Law
Society of Upper Canada <http://www.1sue.on.ca/media/mar3l 10scjprotocol.pdf>.
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fair to say that the concerns identified in the earlier paper are somewhat
ameliorated by the lack of formal disciplinary action taken with respect to
civility, although even there informal regulatory mechanisms, the cross-
jurisdictional publicity from disciplinary cases, and the public statements
made by regulators, 2 6 mean that the civility movement will still have an
impact on lawyer regulation and conduct. And in Ontario and British
Columbia the disciplinary attention paid to civility, and the introduction
of the Civility Complaints protocol, makes the questions raised about the
virtues and dangers of the civility movement more pressing than ever.
II. Civility canaries
In four of the ten post-2007 civility decisions, the lawyers who acted
with incivility can reasonably be portrayed as in ethical disarray, with
their incivility to other lawyers, the court, or their clients highlighting or
representing the broader ethical failings of their law practices. Thus, in
Law Society of Upper Canada v Lyle 7 the lawyer acknowledged that on
three different occasions he had filed affidavits that were false or with
respect to which he had not taken steps to ensure their accuracy.28 He also
acknowledged that he had been found in civil contempt of court in relation
to the filing of an improper affidavit. 29 In addition, twenty-two complaints
about Lyle's incivility were brought to the attention of the Law Society,
and he acknowledged the accuracy of the numerous allegations as to his
rude behaviour towards his own former clients, other lawyers, individuals
working with Children's Aid, and self-represented litigants.30 Lyle did not
dispute the assessment of his behaviour as professional misconduct, and
based his submissions to the Law Society on his diagnosis with Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and the steps he had taken to treat and
address his own behaviour.
In Law Society of Upper Canada v Coady" the lawyer engaged in a
wide variety of professional misconduct including, inter alia, acting for a
client despite being in a serious conflict of interest 32, filing unmeritorious
applications and engaging in abusive litigation33; ignoring court orders34 ;
26. Such as the statements by the President of the Federation of Law Societies at the International
Legal Ethics Conference, supra note 3.
27. Lyle, supra note 20.
28. Ibid at para 4 and 5.
29. Ibid at para 32.
30. Ibid at para 4 and 5.
31. Law Society of Upper Canada v Coady, 2009 ONLSHP 0051 [Coady]; and 2010 ONLSHP 0004.
32. Coady, supra note 32 at para 44.
33. Ibid at, e.g., para 120 and 198.
34. Ibid at para 167.
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failing to render a proper account to a client35; and trading on a mortgage
obtained for a former client.36 In general the panel described her behaviour
in this way:
Having observed her demeanor throughout this hearing, we conclude that
in this instance Coady continued her pattern of conduct in the numerous
civil and other proceedings in which she has been involved over the
years. She uses rules of procedure, intended to promote procedural
fairness, as instruments to frustrate, delay and inflict financial hardship
on her opponents and enemies, whoever she perceives them to be.37
Coady also made rude and unfounded allegations about the ethics and
conduct of various judges who had made rulings against her," about
former clients,39 and about other lawyers40 or parties 41 involved in cases
against her.
In Law Society of Upper Canada v Ranieri,42 the lawyer
misappropriated client funds, failed to serve her clients, and engaged in
unauthorized practice of law. She was also personally abusive to a client43
and, on an earlier occasion, punched a client in the nose." In Law Society
of Upper Canada v Townley-Smith the lawyer made unfounded allegations
in litigation, offered evidence and opinion while acting as an advocate, and
failed to cooperate with the Law Society.45
In each of these cases the lawyer's incivility represented, or formed
part of, a broad and serious pattern of professional misconduct. It may
be, however, that the lawyer's incivility brought his or her misbehaviour
to the attention of the law society and that the law society's concern with
incivility motivated it to investigate the lawyer. This may be particularly
the case with Lyle, whose other misbehaviour was less obvious and
serious, while his incivility had led to a significant number of complaints
being made against him. It may be that in his case, and to a lesser but
still observable extent in the cases of Coady, Ranieri, and Townley-Smith,
incivility was an effective signal for the law society that there was a reason
to be concerned with issues of professional misconduct.
35. Ibidatpara 159.
36. Ibid at para 223 and 227.
37. Ibid at para 273.
38. Ibid at, e.g., para 191, 200, and 271.
39. Ibid at para 197.
40. Ibidatpara261.
41. Ibid at para 275.
42. Ranieri 2009 and Ranieri 2011, supra note 20.
43. Ibid.
44. Ranieri 2009, supra note 20.
45. Townley-Smith, supra note 20.
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This use of incivility as a heuristic for identifying lawyers whose
practices have fallen into disarray, and as a trigger for investigation
of those lawyers, seems like a justifiable use of law society regulatory
power. Although a study based on only four cases does not demonstrate
an empirical connection between incivility and other sorts of professional
misconduct, the cases do suggest that such a link can exist, and that a pattern
of incivility warrants further inquiry and investigation by the law society.
The link is not between a discrete incident of incivility (e.g., confined to
one matter) and professional misconduct, but between pervasive incivility
across a lawyer's practice and other ethical issues with that practice. It
should also be noted that the cases do not demonstrate the legitimacy of
civility discipline per se, because in the cases the incivility was linked so
inextricably to the other issues with the lawyers' practice that one cannot
independently assess its ethical significance. With those qualifications
noted, these cases do justify some law society concern with civility. To
the extent pervasive incivility provides a useful signal that a lawyer is in
serious professional difficulty, it should motivate further investigation into
the practices of those lawyers to determine whether they pose a threat to
the public.46
III. Obscuring the real problems
As noted in the introduction, one of the key arguments in the 2008 civility
paper was that when civility is used to describe otherwise unethical
conduct it tends to obfuscate rather than illuminate our understanding of
46. One significant issue with this approach-and the Lyle case hints at this point, although it does
not directly raise it-is that lawyers with pervasive incivility and practices falling into disarray may
have mental health issues. As noted by Amy Salyzyn in a comment to me on this paper: "dealing with
[mental illness] under the auspices of civility would seem to risk such illnesses not being effectively
or humanely addressed in some cases."
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why that conduct was unethical. 47 Some of the post-2007 civility cases
reinforce this perception of the risks of civility regulation.4 8
This is most obvious-and surprising-in the Supreme Court of
Canada's recent judgment regarding the behaviour of Gilles Dor6. In
2001, Dore had appeared before Justice Boilard in the Superior Court of
Quebec seeking a stay of proceedings against his client or that his client
be released on bail. Justice Boilard's treatment of Dord in that application
was improper. He characterized Dor6 as impudent, his arguments as "idle
quibbling," and his application as "totally ridiculous." 49 After the hearing,
Dor6 did three things. First, he wrote an extremely angry and personally
abusive letter to Justice Boilard. Second, he wrote a letter to the Chief
Justice requesting that he not appear before Justice Boilard again. Third
(and a month later), he complained about Justice Boilard to the Canadian
Judicial Council. Justice Boilard was reprimanded by the Canadian
47. For a discussion of the extent to which civility codes tend to duplicate existing professional
obligations of lawyers see Brenda Smith, "Civility Codes: The Newest Weapons in the 'Civil' War
Over Proper Attorney Conduct Regulations Miss Their Mark" (1998) 24 Dayton L Rev 151 at 162-
166. See also Adam Owen Glist, "Enforcing Courtesy: Default Judgments and the Civility Movement"
(2000) 69 Fordham L Rev 757, suggesting that civility is not the most effective way to prevent the
improper use of default judgments.
48. In addition to Dord and Murphy, discussed here, see Lanning and Ludmer, supra note 11. In
Lanning the lawyer was disciplined for incivility to an unrepresented litigant. By focusing on Lanning's
incivility, the Law Society did not address the ethical problems arising from the extent to which
behaviour like Lanning's can create real barriers to an unrepresented litigant accessing the justice
system. Further, because it did not address that question, it also did not illuminate the complexity that
arises for lawyers when dealing with an unrepresented litigant on the other side. In such cases the
lawyer may be able to legitimately (i.e., through the operation of law) obtain advantages for her client
that she might not be able to obtain were the opposing party represented. That is unlikely to be viewed
as an ethical issue provided that the lawyer does not distort the law's operation. At the other extreme,
a lawyer should not engage in intimidation or bullying of an unrepresented litigant; doing so is clearly
improper. But what about the middle ground? Does the lawyer have any obligations indealing with
unrepresented litigants that are different when dealing with a represented party? If so, how are those
obligations properly defined? In Ludmer the lawyer acted for a client in a family law matter where
there was an allegation of parental alienation. Ludmer had himself been involved in a family law
dispute in which that issue was raised and he felt passionately about it. Indeed, those feelings seem
to have motivated his representation of the client since he otherwise had no background in the family
law area. He also had had past dealings with the law firm representing the opposing party in his
own family matter. Ludmer's uncivil conduct appears to have arisen from his excessive engagement
with the case. Conflicts rules generally prohibit lawyers from acting in any case where they have an
interest which is "likely to affect adversely a lawyer's judgment on behalf of, or loyalty to, a client
or prospective client": The Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules of Professional Conduct, Toronto:
LSUC, 2000, Rule 2.04(i)(a). An important issue with respect to the conflicts rules is as to when a
personal conviction or belief impairs the lawyer's ability to provide disinterested and professional
advice. The facts of Ludmer suggest that the lawyer's personal convictions and beliefs undermined
his ability to provide dispassionate and professional advice to his client; the case would have provided
the Law Society with an excellent opportunity to provide guidance to lawyers at the point where their
over-engagement should preclude representation. The focus on civility meant that that guidance was
not provided.
49. Dore, supra note 5 at para 9.
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Judicial Council. For his part, after receiving Dord's letter Justice Boilard
made a complaint against Dor6 to the Barreau du Qu6bec, where it was
decided that Dor6 was guilty of professional misconduct on the basis of
incivility; Dor6 had violated the requirement that he act with "objectivity,
moderation and dignity."so Dor6 challenged that decision to the Supreme
Court of Canada. The Supreme Court upheld the Barreau's decision,
holding that while lawyers were not required to be "verbal eunuchs" and
had a right and (perhaps) a duty to "speak their minds freely," they are
nonetheless constrained "to do so with dignified restraint," a restraint that
Dore failed to achieve."
What neither the Barreau nor the Supreme Court address, however,
is the fact that even had Dore written the nicest possible letter to Justice
Boilard, perhaps a letter of thanks for Justice Boilard's favourable ruling
in a case in which he had appeared, a letter praising Justice Boilard's
intelligence, justice, and wisdom, his conduct would have been an
improper violation of his professional duties. Our system of justice
rests on the premise that the justice it discharges will be both public and
impersonal. A judge's life need not be monastic, but the intermixing of
the public and impersonal resolution of a case with a personal and private
correspondence between participants about that case, even after the fact,
undermines the ability of the system to achieve the necessary impartiality.
In Dord's situation, the matter on which he was acting was still before
the courts. Further, Justice Boilard was presiding over a related trial.52 If
Dor6 had sent a praising but also private and personal letter about Justice
Boilard's actions in court, there would be reason to be concerned about the
propriety of that action and its effect on the fair administration ofjustice. 3
Would the Crown counsel appearing on the prosecution who later learned
about the existence of the letter of praise continue to be confident that the
case would be decided on the merits? Surely in a matter before the courts
we expect that the communication between judges and lawyers about that
matter-whether with regard to its substance or with regard to how the
judges and lawyers are conducting themselves-will occur transparently
50. Ibid at para 60.
51. Ibidatpara68.
52. Ibid at para 15.
53. See Re Gleason, 2012 WL 4857014 CA 11 (Fla), in which the Court held that a lawyer had acted
improperly because of his uncivil conduct before a judge but also because of the conciliatory letter and
bottle of wine he subsequently sent to that judge. It must be noted, though, that the impropriety in that
case arose in part because disciplinary proceedings before the Court were pending against Gleason.
See online: <http://www.call.uscourts.gov/unpub/ops/201211433.pdf>.
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in open court or in communications seen by all counsel. This is a basic
requirement of natural justice.54
Yet at no point does the Supreme Court address this aspect of Dord's
conduct." This omission is unfortunate, because the facts of the case pro-
vided an opportunity for the Barreau and the Court to illuminate the question
of when the private dealings between lawyers and judges undermine the
justice system's impartiality. Does a personal correspondence between a
lawyer and judge about a case cause problems only if the matter is ongoing
before the courts? Or is it a problem even if the matter has ended? Does
it have more significance in a concluded matter if the lawyer is likely to
appear before the judge again in other cases? In general, what level of
personal relationship is acceptable between lawyers and the judges they
appear in front of? Is it a problem, for example, for judges to auction (for
charity) a private dinner with the judges at a bar association dinner-i.e.,
to sell time in their company to lawyers?
Given the comparably small size of many Canadian legal communities,
and the inevitable relationships that judges and lawyers will have
both before and during the time judges sit on the bench, lawyer-judge
relationships create a complex and vexing ethical issue that merits greater
attention than it has received from regulatory bodies, either of lawyers or
of judges. The Dord case's focus on civility denied the Barreau and the
Supreme Court the opportunity to appreciate the existence of that issue, or
to illuminate it in any way. They missed it altogether.
A less obvious but nonetheless important example of the potential for
civility to obscure the complexity ofthe ethical challenges that lawyers face
arises from the 2010 decision Law Society ofUpper Canada v Murphy. That
case addressed the conduct by Kevin Murphy in his defence of Julia Elliott
in a murder trial presided over by then Justice Paul Cosgrove. The Law
Society suspended Murphy for six months for professional misconduct:
The Lawyer failed to treat opposing counsel and other lawyers and other
people with courtesy and civility. He failed to treat opposing counsel
and other lawyers with respect and good faith. Instead, he engaged in
ill-considered and uninformed criticism of opposing counsel and other
lawyers....
54. See, e.g., International Woodworkers ofAmerica v Consolidated Bathurst Packaging Ltd, [ 1990]
1 SCR 282, 68 DLR (4th) 524.
55. This is probably because Dord had no incentive to point out other bases for finding that he had
engaged in professional misconduct while the Barreau was equally unlikely to point out inadequacies
in its own judgment. It is nonetheless somewhat surprising that no judge on the court independently
identified this issue.
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The Lawyer's criticism of counsel was outrageous, shameful and
undermined the values of the administration of justice. This case
was more than a case about incivility. It involved ethical misconduct
that reflected adversely on the integrity of the profession and the
administration of justice as a whole. The Lawyer's actions were more
than merely being fearless and zealously representing his client. He made
accusations without foundation and serious allegations of bad faith. He
made personal attacks on other counsel."
The Law Society report of its decision does not provide much detail
about the nature of Murphy's misconduct because he conceded that
he had engaged in professional misconduct, thus the only issue before
the Law Society was with respect to penalty. A review of the Inquiry
Committee Report into the conduct of Justice Cosgrove at the Elliott trial
reveals, however, that Murphy's misconduct largely consisted in bringing
forward applications or arguments to the court that were factually weak or
legally doubtful. Thus, for example, Murphy argued that the Crown had
participated in improper preparatory meetings, but his "position proved
unfounded" and was not supported by evidence." He also argued that
counsel for the Crown had misrepresented facts in submissions to the court
when in fact the Crown "had been correct in his submissions."" Murphy
made other allegations against the Crown and the police "which were
extreme and unfounded," including the suggestion that the prosecution
of Elliott made the Crown an accessory after the fact for murder, since
the case was "enabling the real murderer to escape."" Murphy also
engaged in "wholly improper" cross-examination60 and used inflammatory
language, suggesting, for example, that the conduct of the Ministry of the
Attorney General in appointing successive Crown attorneys was akin to
the "last days of the Third Reich where Generals and members of the
SS were scrambling, literally like rats deserting a sinking ship, to make
arrangements for themselves."6 1 Earl Cherniak, Independent Counsel
retained to investigate the conduct of Justice Cosgrove and present the
case against him if there was one,6 2 said that in general Murphy's conduct
56. Murphy, supra note 10 at para 15.
57. "Report to the Canadian Judicial Council of the Inquiry Committee Appointed under Subsection
63(3) of the Judges Act to conduct an investigation into the conduct of Mr. Justice Paul Cosgrove"
(27 June 2008), online: <http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/Cosgrove%20submissions%20
Jan%202009/Tab%201.pdf> at para 47.
58. Ibid at para 62.
59. Ibid at para 85.
60. Ibid at para 60.
61. Ibid at para 88.
62. And also for Joe Groia.
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was "one of the most disgraceful exhibitions that has ever been seen in a
Canadian courtroom." 63
As noted, the Law Society of Upper Canada found Murphy to be
guilty of professional misconduct due to his discourtesy and incivility,
but also due to his false, groundless, and personal attacks on opposing
counsel (which law societies usually categorize as incivility, but here view
as having gone further to the point of bringing the administration of justice
into disrepute). The difficulty with the decision-and this is a difficulty
which is to some extent explained by Murphy's admission of guilt-is
that it does not grapple with the challenging ethical issues that arise from
Murphy's actual misconduct in the Elliot trial. Incivility is sufficient to
capture Murphy's invocation of Nazis as an ethical comparator, but that
was only a small part of what Murphy did wrong, and the majority of
his conduct, while improper and quite extreme, raises difficult ethical
questions that could have been usefully illuminated had the decision gone
beyond its reliance on Murphy's incivility.
When lawyers appear before the court, they must not misrepresent or
mislead the court as to the facts or as to the applicable law. This is a clear
and unambiguous ethical duty for any advocate.' It is also clear, however,
that lawyers may-must-raise arguments about the interpretation of
those facts or that law that will assist their client. Those interpretive
arguments must be based on the facts, evidence or law, but may also rely
upon the lawyer's creativity and persuasiveness.65 Yet by categorizing
the issue with Murphy's conduct as a general question of "civility," or as
making false, groundless, and personal attacks on opposing counsel, the
case does not distinguish between circumstances in which Murphy made
up facts66 and circumstances in which he simply invited an implausible
interpretation or inference from facts as they occurred.67 While the first
conduct is obviously unethical, finding the second to be unethical requires
some specific explanation as to how Murphy's conduct differed from
the ordinary course of behaviour of a lawyer who invites an inference or
63. Ibidatpara 35.
64. The Federation of Law Societies of Canada, supra note 14, Rule 4.01(2).
65. Young v Young, [1990] BCJ No 2254, 75 DLR (4th) 46 (BCCA), affirmed on this point [1993]
SCJ No 112, [1993] 4 SCR 3 at 41; Federation of Law Societies of Canada, supra note 14, Rule
4.01(1) and Commentary.
66. For example, saying that the Crown had misrepresented the facts when it had not, Murphy, supra
note 10 at para 48.
67. For example, Murphy took a remark made by the son of Ms. Elliott's victim in the cafeteria and
used it to argue that the son should be found in contempt. That argument was erroneous, but it does not
appear to have been based on a falsehood, ibid at para 87.
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interpretation of the facts that the court ultimately rejects (and which in
that sense could be said to be without substance).6 8
It may also be unclear-and even unclear in terms of Murphy's own
behaviour absent some analysis and explanation-when the lawyer has
falsified or misrepresented facts, as opposed to simply inviting the court
to view those facts in the way most favourable to the client. For example,
Murphy is described as having made "unsubstantiated allegations" that
the Crown participated in improper preparatory meetings about which
they should be required to testify. The Inquiry Committee Report states
that there was "no evidence that any Crown counsel participated in any
meeting warranting his or her being called as a witness" [emphasis
added].69 That statement suggests that meetings did take place, but that
they did not warrant the characterization offered for them by Murphy.
Does that mean that one should infer that some proffered characterizations
or interpretations of evidence are so implausible as to be improper when
made by counsel-i.e., as tantamount to a misrepresentation? Had the Law
Society addressed the specific issues arising from Murphy's behaviour in
making improper representations to the court, it could have established
precedent for identifying what constitutes a false assertion of fact, and
specifically the point at which a misrepresentation may arise from the
lawyer proffering an implausible interpretation of an otherwise accurately
presented fact. Instead the Law Society decision provides no guidance on
that question.
More significantly, the intersection of Murphy and Cosgrove's
behaviour raises a complex and important ethical issue: what should a
lawyer do when he or she appears before a judge who gives the lawyer
more than the lawyer knows that, based on the best interpretation of the law
or evidence, she ought to have obtained? The lawyer may not do anything
improper-she may not have mislead the court as to the facts or the law-
but the judge's inattention, age related diminution in cognitive function,
or some other factor leads the judge to accept the lawyer's relatively less
plausible interpretation of the facts or law. The problem in Murphy was not
just that he made bad arguments and dubious assertions, but that time and
time again Cosgrove accepted them. The Law Society noted Cosgrove's
behaviour as something that ameliorated Murphy's behaviour-he was
caught in the "Cosgrove Storm" 7o-but did not address the significance
68. For a general discussion of the duties of lawyers in offering false factual inferences when
defending criminal accused see Alice Woolley, Understanding Lawyers'Ethics in Canada (Toronto:
LexisNexis, 2011) at 302-308.
69. Murphy, supra note 10 at para 47.
70. Ibid at para 23.
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of the intersection between Cosgrove and Murphy in assessing the ethics
of what Murphy did." Assume a lawyer with a judge similar to Cosgrove,
but who has enough ethical skill to avoid Murphy's misrepresentations
of the facts. If appearing before a judge like Cosgrove, the lawyer could
nonetheless win a series of legally or factually doubtful victories that might
undermine entirely the fairness of the trial and its substantive validity.
Does that lawyer have an obligation to ameliorate his advocacy-to shift
to something less than ordinary resolute advocacy-to try and prevent
that sort of injustice? Strategically the lawyer does need to ensure that
the judgment will withstand a challenge on appeal, and winning dubious
motions may make that less likely. As a matter of ethics, however, does an
unfair judge place a different burden on the counsel appearing before that
judge and obtaining the benefit of that unfairness?72 Might, for example,
a counsel have an obligation to avoid putting forward stereotypical or
discriminatory inferences where the lawyer knows that the judge is likely
to adopt those inferences even though the judge ought not to do so in law?"
The Law Society decision does not provide any explanation or analysis of
those questions, or guidance to lawyers who might face them.
It is certain that when analyzed in light of those issues, Murphy's
conduct-or at least the vast majority of it-would be properly
characterized as professional misconduct. And, as noted earlier, the fact of
Murphy's admission of guilt makes the absence of detailed explanation by
the Law Society understandable. Nonetheless, had the issue been framed
with emphasis on the primary question of the nature and constraints on the
lawyer's duty as an advocate, rather than on Murphy's lack of civility, even
brief reasons might have illuminated these difficult ethical questions, and
particularly the question of a lawyer's obligations when appearing before
a judge who acts improperly or incompetently in the lawyer's favour.
IV. Expressive differences
One question raised by the civility movement is the extent to which it
valorizes a particular model of the good lawyer, the gentleman lawyer
71. I want to emphasize that I do not think Cosgrove's behaviour in any way excuses Murphy's. The
question is simply whether any additional or distinct obligations arise for a lawyer when a judge acts
as Cosgrove did-i.e., did Murphy have added duties to try and prevent unjust rulings in his client's
favour?
72. On the related question of the ethical duties of lawyers dealing with opposing counsel who are
incompetent see Lizabeth L Murrell, "Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Importance of Internal
Calibration in Balancing Zeal for One's Client with Duties to the Legal System When Your Adversary
is Incompetent" (2011) 23 USF Mar LJ 265.
73. See, e.g., Mike McIntrye, "Judge's Rape Ruling 'Beyond Sexist,"' Edmonton Journal (25
February 2011), online: <http://www2.canada.comledmontonjournal/news/story.html?id=94bd22e3-
474c-4aeb-af3f- 1 23ea87c1 d4>.
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who, if he acts for the marginalized or downtrodden, nonetheless advocates
with reticence and rectitude.74 While anyone would hesitate to criticize the
lawyer who aspired to that ideal, the question for the civility movement
is whether disciplining lawyers for incivility may render invisible other
less conventional forms of lawyer goodness, and characterize difference
as deviance."
That possibility is raised by the case of Law Society of Upper Canada
v Guiste."6 Guiste came before the Law Society largely because of a series
of interactions with three lawyers from the same firm over the course of
two cases. He also had one interaction with a court in which he made
comments that were characterized by the judge as disrespectful to the
court and to other counsel. None of these interactions involved Guiste
in conduct that was substantively unethical, but did involve a variety of
behaviour that was both aggressive and outside conventional norms of
civil behaviour. Thus during a mediation Guiste repeatedly used the word
"fuck."" He stated that you don't need to "grab a tit for it to be sexual
harassment."" He told a lawyer to take an offer and "shove it up your ass.""
He described a lawyer as having a client who (in contrast to Guiste's) is
a "CASH COW.""o He suggested that the lawyer had described a motion
"like it is the second coming of Jesus Christ!"' He further suggested that a
lawyer's logic would mean that "a man would be free to rape a woman in
the workplace and her only civil remedy would be to go to the OHRC."82
In correspondence to a lawyer Guiste stated: "This in fact has nothing to
do with your client. Play at your own risk.-Play at your own risk! Play at
74. In a paper presented at this year's International Legal Ethics Conference in Banff, see supra
note 3, Amy Salyzyn suggested that both the models of the civility movement-the bad lawyer and
the good lawyer-are specifically masculine exemplars: Amy Salyzyn, "Gender and the Civility
Movement: John Rambo v Atticus Finch."
75. This possibility arises in part from the difficulty civility advocates have in defining what civility
means. In one 2005 article the author declined to define civility, observing in a footnote that "Any
attempt to define civility or professionalism will fall short in one form or another": Bronson Bills,
"Civility and the Young Lawyer" (2005) 5 Conn Pub Int LJ 31 at fn 26. That may be observably true,
but it does heighten the tendency of civility to be in the eye of the beholder. Campbell, supra note 6,
reviews the United States regulation of lawyer civility and through that review identifies the ten core
concepts that make up the lawyer's duty of civility. Campbell suggests that judges themselves should
make greater efforts to define what they mean by civility and that "courts enforcing civility through
sanction should be particularly careful that they are not chilling a lawyer's valid advocacy," at 145.
76. Guiste, supra note 12.
77. Ibid at para 6.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid at para 32.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
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your own risk!"83 He was described as having been belligerent and profane
to a lawyer's receptionist. 84 He commented to a junior female lawyer on a
case that it was "funny how big law firms send young female associates on
sexual harassment motions."" There were a number of other examples of
similar comments by Guiste.
Lawyers who supported Guiste described him as having demonstrated
"passion for access to justice issues" in his practice. The Law Society noted
his "commitment to marginalized and downtrodden litigants with modest
means." 86 Ultimately, though, the Law Society held that Guiste's incivility
amounted to professional misconduct. It reprimanded him, required that
he practice with a mentor for two years, and that he provide an unqualified
apology to the three lawyers to whom he was rude."
Was Guiste's behaviour properly characterized as professional
misconduct? His comments were forceful, profane, crude, and colourful.
They would not have been made by a "gentleman" lawyer. Guiste's
language suggests that he would be hard pressed to fit that mold-he seems
most unlikely to tell anyone to go to "H-E-double hockey sticks."" But his
comments were also largely directed at lawyers from a single law firm
over the course of protracted and hotly contested litigation, litigation with
respect to which the Law Society stated "the Lawyer, acting as counsel for
the Plaintiff was attempting to move his matter along the best he could for
his client but was frustrated with the opposing counsel's delay tactics.""
I would suggest that a legal profession committed to substantive justice
could accommodate lawyers with a greater degree of crudity and colour
than the Guiste decision contemplates. Further, refusing to countenance
that sort of variety in practice may only legislate a higher class of insult,
allowing lawyers to be cutting or rude provided they use the right sort of
language. Fiddlesticks, yes; fuck, no.90 Finally, and most importantly, it




86. Guiste 2011, supra note 12 at para 33.
87. Ibid at para 44-46. Costs were determined in a separate proceeding.
88. Michael Barbaro & Ashley Parker, "Gosh, who talks like that now? Romney does," New
York Times (20 October 2012), online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/21/us/politics/romneys-
throwback-language-his-mittisms.html?hp>.
89. Guiste, supra note 12 at para 38.
90. As noted below at note 124, criminal defence lawyers have been observed to be especially
inclined to profanity. As Abbe Smith notes, "some words are just more expressive than others,
especially the adjective form of the f-word." Abbe Smith, Case of a Lifetime: A Criminal Defense
Lawyer's Story (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011) at 33.
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racial mainstream, whose background and experience gives them different
aspirations and perceptions about good advocacy. 91
Perhaps the relatively less significant penalty imposed on Guiste shows
that the Law Society recognized these risks to some extent; however, any
disciplinary proceeding, with its associated costs, imposed reputational
injury, and impairment of the lawyer's practice and mobility, cannot be
considered a minor consequence. Guiste's conduct was condemned and the
decision sends the message that Guiste cannot be considered to be a good
lawyer so long as he practices in this way. That is troubling given Guiste's
commitment to the highest ideals of the profession-the representation of
the "marginalized and downtrodden."
V. Creating the wrong incentives
The question of whether civility movements excessively constrain our
definition of the "good lawyer" is also implicated by the final two cases of
note, Groia and Laarakker. Both Groia and Laarakker's asserted incivility
came in the context of a just cause, the defence of an innocent9 2 accused
and a response to unethical conduct by another lawyer. But both of them
were sanctioned because of their failure to pursue those causes in a manner
their respective law societies viewed as sufficiently polite.
The cases also raise the important question of whether civility
movements create perverse incentives in relation to lawyers' satisfaction
of their core ethical obligations, in particular zealous advocacy and fidelity
to law. When law societies discipline lawyers who do the right thing in the
"wrong" way, imposing both official sanction and unofficial disgrace, they
create the possibility that lawyers will forego doing the right thing for fear
that they, too, will be seen to have gone about it in the wrong way.
The Law Society's decision in the Groia case has been appealed,
and certain legal holdings render the decision susceptible to a successful
application for judicial review. Specifically, a reviewing court may take
exception to the Law Society's reliance on statements made about Groia
by the courts in applications for judicial review brought by the OSC in R v
Felderhof The Law Society based that reliance on the position that Groia
91. See Amy Mashburn, "Making Civility Democrat" (2011) 47 Hous L Rev 1147; and Amy
Mashburn, "Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy" (1994) 28 Val U L
Rev 657.
92. A not-guilty verdict does not always demonstrate innocence: see, e.g., OJ Simpson and R v
Mullins-Johnson (2007), 28 CCC (3d) 505 (Ont CA), in which the Court rejected the argument that
an acquittal is tantamount to a finding of innocence. Where, however, an accused has been found not
guilty and there has been no material doubt raised about that verdict he is entitled to this descriptor.
It should be noted with respect to Felderhof, that the RCMP also decided that there was insufficient
evidence to bring charges against him. See below note 96.
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was a party in "substance" to the applications." Given the jurisprudence on
the role of the lawyer in the criminal justice system, a reviewing court may
also reject the Law Society's position that defence counsel have a super-
added duty to ensure that trials proceed "fairly and efficiently and in an
atmosphere of calm."94 The analysis here considers only the determination
that Groia was guilty of professional misconduct because of his incivility
during the first part of the Felderhof trial, and the implications of that
determination for lawyers' willingness to engage in zealous advocacy in
light of the broader context in which Groia's conduct occurred.95
Groia's client was John Felderhof, a geologist for Bre-X who was
accused of securities offences because it was alleged that he had been
complicit in a fraudulent scheme to make it appear that Bre-X had found
significant gold resources when it had not done so. Felderhof was widely
assumed to be guilty by the press and public-even today it is said that he
is "the man who cannot clear his name."96 From the outset it would have
been obvious that defending Felderhof would be both time consuming and
complicated. Although Felderhof had financial resources at the beginning
of the prosecution, a reasonable lawyer could have anticipated what
actually occurred, which was that Felderhof lost the ability to pay his legal
bills long before the conclusion of the trial. Felderhof still owes Groia
approximately $2M in fees.
The approach of the prosecution to the pursuit of Felderhof's case was
aggressive. On the first day of the trial the Director of Communications for
the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) stood on the courthouse steps
and told the media that the OSC's goal was "simply to seek a conviction
on the charges that we have laid."98 Two days later the OSC prosecutor
Jay Naster responded to a motion filed by the defence seeking better
production of documents in accordance with the Crown's Stinchcombe
disclosure obligations. In so doing Naster cross-examined thejunior lawyer
93. Groia, supra note 4 at para 92.
94. Ibid at para 37.
95. It should be noted that I was an expert witness for Groia in his law society hearing. My
testimony was directed towards the question of the ethical obligations of defence lawyers and criminal
prosecutors although I was also questioned by both the Law Society counsel and the panel on the issue
of civility. The Law Society did not address my evidence on defence/prosecutor obligations in its
decision. It held that with respect to civility my evidence added nothing to my writing on the subject,
that my writing was directed towards removing civility obligations from codes of conduct which was
not probative for the proceeding, and that I asserted a non-demonstrable connection between civility
discipline and a "chill" on zealous advocacy. Ibid at para 43-46.
96. Shannon Kari, "Bre-x's John Felderhof: The Man Who Cannot Clear His Name," Financial Post
(12 March 2010), online: <http://www.cbc.calfp/story/2010/03/12/2675139.html#ixzz2A974zalE>.
97. Ibid.
98. Groia, supra note 4 at para 111.
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who swore the supporting affidavit listing the relevant correspondence
"aggressively" for one and a half days.99 In the course of the disclosure
motion the prosecution acknowledged that it had not produced documents
that should have been produced.'00 The judge granted the defence motion
on disclosure and stated that the comment by the OSC's Director of
Communications "offends what the Courts have repeatedly said is the role
of the prosecution."o' Later in the trial Naster was "rebuked by the court
for... sarcastic comments" 0 2 made during the course of the trial. He was
also censured for suggesting that the court's rulings were "presumptively
wrong and unfair."0 3 The intensity of the prosecution is also suggested
by the conduct of OSC counsel in the course of the judicial applications
brought by the OSC seeking to have the trial judge removed in part
because of his failure to address Groia's conduct. In argument on those
applications counsel for the OSC accused Groia of telling "bald faced
lies" and as being like "someone who drops a bomb and runs."'0 Those
statements drew a "swift rebuke" from the Superior Court judge presiding
at the application.'
In short, this was a difficult case to defend. In conducting Felderhof's
defence, Groia was critical of the ethics and conduct of the prosecutor and
used sarcasm and similar rhetorical methods to advance his arguments.
While Groia, unlike Naster, was neither rebuked nor censured by the trial
judge, 06 at various points he:
99. Ibidatpara 115.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid at para 117.
102. Ibid at 160.
103. Ibid at 173.
104. Richard Blackwell, "OSC alleges lawyer lied in Bre-X trial," Globe and Mail (22 November
2001) B3.
105. Ibid. They were also part of the basis for the statements by Campbell J noted in footnote 106.
106. The District Court and Ontario Court of Appeal were very critical of Groia's conduct in their
judgments denying the OSC's application to remove the trial judge, although Campbell J at the District
Court also stated that "Neither side in this case has any monopoly over incivility or rhetorical excess":
R v Felderhof [2002] OTC 829, 55 WCB (2d) 572 at para 264. As noted, the statements of the District
Court and the Ontario Court of Appeal about Groia were a significant basis for the Law Society's
decision that Groia was guilty of professional misconduct. The Law Society's reliance on those
statements is, however, legally dubious since Groia was not a party to those motions; the comments
made by the court were in obiter since both courts declined to remove the trial judge from the case; and
Felderhof and the independent counsel retained by him (Brian Greenspan) made a strategic decision
not to make the defence of Groia's conduct a significant part of their response to the OSC's motions.
The OSC failed to have the trial judge removed. See Groia, supra note 4 at para 39; R v Felderhof
(2003), 180 CCC (3d) 498, 235 DLR (4th) 131, 68 OR (3d) 481 (CA).
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* Suggested that the prosecution was trying to "win at any costs" 07;
* Stated that the prosecution was seeking an "unfair advantage"108 ;
* Said that the prosecution was making it "as difficult as possible"
for Felderhof to defend himself 09;
* Suggested that the prosecution was "lazy," had not "done theirjob,"
had "turned a blind eye," and had "stuck their head in the sand"; 0
* Described the "Crown" as the "government""';
* Suggested that it was not possible to do anything in furtherance
of the defence "without the Government wanting to take some
advantage or get some other document in"'2;
* Suggested that the prosecutor was using a "conviction filter" with
respect to the documents it was willing to allow to be admitted as
evidence;
* Accused the prosecutor of conducting the prosecution "in a manner
which offends the principle that the duty of the Crown is not to seek
a conviction" while not bringing a motion alleging prosecutorial
misconduct" ;
* Stated that the "the Government's case has more holes in it than a
lobster trap in Nova Scotia" and that the prosecutor was trying to
"frustrate the defence's attempt to represent Mr. Felderhof""';
* Stated that the "Government's promises aren't worth the transcripts
they appear to be written on"' ';
* Described the prosecutor as whining about the need to prosecute
Mr. Felderhof in "accordance with certain fundamental rules"' 6;
* Suggested that the court was "no more able to get a straight answer
out of the prosecutor than the defence has been""'; and
* Suggested that the prosecution's approach to document management
was "the most nonsensical proposal for a Government prosecutor
that one could imagine.""'8
107. Groia, supra note 4 at para 109.
108. Ibid at para 106.
109. Ibid at para 116.
110. Ibid at para 118. See also para 129.
111. Ibid at para 123 and 129. As noted below, I am uncertain as to how this was either inaccurate or
uncivil.
112. Ibid at para 130.
113. Ibid at para 134.
114. Ibid at para 140.
115. Ibid at para 142.
116. Ibid. at para 148.
117. Ibid at para 155.
118. Ibid at para 168.
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In support of its position that Mr. Groia had engaged in professional
misconduct, the Law Society disciplinary panel noted in particular that
Mr. Groia's allegations of prosecutorial misconduct were not brought in
the context of a motion for a stay of proceedings. The panel suggested
that Groia knew that his allegations of prosecutorial misconduct were
legally wrong insofar as a failure to produce documents does not, they
said, constitute prosecutorial misconduct."' The panel further suggested
that Groia's statements were part of a "trial strategy aimed at baiting the
prosecution into making mistakes or aimed at convincing the trial judge
through rhetoric rather than evidence." 20 It also rejected the argument that
civility discipline has the potential to "chill" zealous advocacy. The panel
found that requirements of civility have been present in codes of conduct
for many years, and that there is no evidence to suggest that zealous
advocacy has been chilled as a consequence:
As we have previously observed, the lawyer's obligation of civility and
courtesy has been part of our rules of professional conduct for a long
time. There is no evidence that these long-standing obligations have
fettered or encumbered the lawyer's duty to defend her client resolutely
within the limits of the law. Moreover, the Rules ofProfessional Conduct
serve to ensure a rational, calm environment, which leads to better and
more timely decisions. Thus, when lawyers observe the rules governing
professional conduct, civility enhances, rather than detracts from, a more
efficient justice system, prevents unfair outcomes and promotes greater
access to justice for accused persons.12 1
The Law Society is of course correct to observe that there is no
empirical evidence that civility discipline has impeded zealous advocacy.
It is also fair to suggest that lawyers acting with civility can often have
a positive effect on the administration of justice. The argument against
civility regulation does not assert that civility is a bad thing; civility can be
119. While it may be fair to say that a failure to disclose will rarely or never lead to a stay of
proceedings, the basis for the Law Society's statement that a failure to disclose is not prosecutorial
misconduct seems strange. See in general, Krieger v Law Society ofAlberta, 2002 SCC 65, [2002] 3
SCR 372.
120. Ibid at para 89.
121. Ibid at para 70.
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a legitimate professional aspiration. 22 The problem with the Law Society's
position, however, is that there is also no evidence to suggest that regulation
of civility has not impeded zealous advocacy. There is no evidence one
way or another. Further, the circumstances and result in the Groia case
invite the logical inference that disciplining lawyers for incivility will
make those lawyers less willing to act as zealous advocates in cases like
Felderhof's. Knowing the outcome of the Groia decision, what would a
rational lawyer do if a client like John Felderhof walks into his office-that
is, a client presumed guilty by the press, aggressively prosecuted by the
OSC, and with a legally and factually complicated case? What would that
rational lawyer do if advised that in representing his Felderhof-esque client
he would be dealing with a prosecutor who in the first few months of the
trial would be reprimanded by the court twice for inappropriate comments,
would fail to provide proper disclosure as required by law, would in
defence of that inadequate disclosure spend a day and half aggressively
cross-examining a junior lawyer on an inconsequential affidavit, and
would be presenting the case on behalf of an administrative agency whose
Director of Communications stated that its goal was "simply to convict"?
What would that rational lawyer do if further advised that in the conduct
of the case his allegations that the prosecutor had engaged in prosecutorial
misconduct would be viewed as professional misconduct because while
the prosecutor had acted improperly, that improper conduct was not so
egregious as to warrant a stay of proceedings? And that his describing
a "Crown" as "government" would, even though a prosecutor is clearly
122. For a discussion of the virtues of civility in society and in legal practice see Russell G Pearce
& Eli Wald, "The Obligation of Lawyers to Heal Civic Culture: Confronting the Ordeal of Incivility
in the Practice of Law" (2011) 34 U Ark Little Rock L Rev 1. It should be noted that Pearce and
Wald's argument requires not just that lawyers be more polite, but that they reconceive their ethical
obligations altogether: "Our main contention is that as neutral partisans, lawyers have contributed
to the civic malaise, in and outside of the legal profession. No matter how lawyers view their role,
they do serve as civics teachers who explain the appropriate responsibilities of citizenship both in
their everyday practice and in their civic leadership. Available evidence suggests that many, if not
most, lawyers today practice and teach the autonomous self-interest approach of the Holmesian bad
man-the individual's obligations to the spirit of the law and the community are only what they can
get away with within the bounds of the law. In this way, lawyers as civics teachers have promoted the
commitment to autonomous self-interest not only in the private dealings of clients but in culturally
manufacturing autonomous self-interest as the dominant paradigm of public discourse and in the
resulting erosion of relational self-interest as a countervailing influence. We assert that lawyers should
instead draw upon the relational tradition found in professionalism and the lawyer's historic role to
encourage public dialogue, help repair our civic culture, and suggest to clients relational means of
pursuing their interests," at 5. This may indirectly support the suggestion here that civility tends to run
against norms of zealous advocacy.
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a state actor, be viewed as falling "below the standard of professional
conduct required by the lawyer before the court"?
If that rational lawyer knows all of that, and is self-aware enough to
recognize that he has the typical pugnacious and defensive persona of the
successful criminal defence counsel, 2 4 then surely he would at least be
strongly tempted to suggest that his Felderhof-esque client look elsewhere
for representation.
Undoubtedly Groia could-and perhaps should-have acted with
greater restraint in his representation of Felderhof. His language was
sarcastic and belittled the integrity and conduct of Nasterl25 in a way that
did not in and of itself help to progress the trial. His representation of
Felderhof was, as he has acknowledged,'2 6 not perfect. But failing to grant
any leeway to lawyers acting in cases as difficult as Felderhof's leads to
the logical inference that, if lawyers are rational and self-aware, they will
avoid those sorts of cases.
That is a problem in any criminal case since even a guilty client is
entitled to a defence, but it must also be remembered that Felderhof was in
fact acquitted. He was a client whose case represented a major challenge
but who was not guilty and who in that sense could claim a particular
entitlement to legal representation. 27 This is the incentive problem created
by civility regulation. The Law Society believes that civility regulation
will create incentives for lawyers to be more polite when they zealously
advocate for clients. But if a lawyer knows that the circumstances of a
case and his own temperament make that outcome unlikely, his rational
response will be simply to avoid the hard cases where the risks of engaging
in behaviour the Law Society disapproves of are too high.
123. Groia, supra note 4 at para 123.
124. One American commentator has amusingly summarized the "identifying attributes" of the
criminal defence lawyer. They include being "mostly Italian, Jewish, or Irish males," being "often
quite short" so that they "were forced to fight for their honor among bigger, stronger classmates, thus
becoming 'defensive' and that they "can't complete a sentence that doesn't include the F-word. The
more frequently and creatively it's used, the more effectively they feel they've communicated (e.g.,
'I ordered a f ing tuna salad on wheat, and that flea-brained f brought me a ham and cheese on
pumper-f ing-nickel." Mary Halloran, "An Ode to Criminal Lawyers" (1998) California Lawyer 96
cited in Smith, Case of a Lifetime, supra note 90. It should be noted that in my own experience Groia
is not actually profane.
125. Ibid at para 139. Who, for his part, suggested that Groia was lacking in "consistency" and
"fairness."
126. When Groia made a presentation to a legal ethics class at the University of Calgary in the fall of
2010 he acknowledged this point.
127. Whether or not a client's innocence should be a valid consideration in the lawyer's decision to
represent that client is a matter of philosophical dispute. Under the Canadian law governing lawyers, a
lawyer may select clients on the basis of his or her conscience. See Woolley, Understanding Lawyers'
Ethics in Canada, supra note 68 at 46-52; Allan Hutchinson, "Taking it Personally: Legal Ethics and
Client Selection" (1998) 1 Legal Ethics 168-183.
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Further, even within a representation a lawyer may face circumstances
where the requirements of zealous advocacy rub against the law societies'
requirement of civility. In a paper presented at the International Legal
Ethics Conference,12 1 Mary Eberts recounted her experience acting in a
matter where the judge invoked a racist stereotype in relation to the validity
of her client's case. Eberts responded with civility-addressing the judge's
point but not rebuking his use of the stereotype in open court. She now
regrets that choice, believing that her client's later (successful) complaint
to the Canadian Judicial Council, while accompanied with publicity, was
insufficient to address the client's strongly felt belittlement and betrayal.
Her response did not effectively rectify the injury to her client's confidence
in the fair administration ofjustice. Yet Eberts also recognizes that having
responded differently could have placed her offside the requirements
of lawyer civility; however inadequate for her client's goals, her muted
response was the one that the civility movement contemplates. Although
the Law Society in Groia denies that civility and advocacy conflict, the
Eberts story illustrates that at the point of risk assessment-that is, at the
point when choosing whether to do something to advocate for a client that
might be viewed as uncivil-the conflict is real, irreducible, and created
by the Law Society's regulatory choices.
That key point of this final section-that civility discipline creates
incentives for lawyers to emphasize civility at the expense of central
professional obligations-is further demonstrated by the final case, Law
Society of British Columbia v Laarakker. I have discussed the Laarakker
case in detail elsewhere12 ' and will focus only on the main issues here.
Laarakker's client received a demand letter seeking recovery for "losses"
suffered by a retailer as a consequence ofthe client's daughter's shoplifting.
Such letters are of dubious legal validity: where goods are recovered it is
not obvious that a retailer has suffered any legally cognizable loss, and
parents are only responsible for losses occasioned by their children's
wrongdoing in exceptional cases. A Manitoba judge once said of a lawyer
who sent a similar letter that, "as a competent and responsible lawyer, he
knew or ought to have known that the claim had no prospect whatsoever
of succeeding in court and that it would be futile to pursue it." 30
128. Mary Eberts, "Counsel's Dilemma." This description x4ras further confirmed in an e-mail
exchange with Ms Eberts on 23 October 2012.
129. See Alice Woolley, "Lawyers Regulating Lawyers," ABlavg (3 November 2011), online: <http://
ablawg.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/ll /blogawlaarakkernov20l .pdf> and "Lawyers Regulating
Lawyers (Redux)," ABlawg (11 June 2012), online: <http://ablawg.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/
blogawlIsuccomplaintjune2Ol2.pdf>.
130. DCB v Zellers Inc, [1996] MJ No 362 (QB) at para 18, [1996] 10 WWR 689.
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In response to this demand letter Laarakker wrote a post on a blog
criticizing lawyers who send such letters as "sleazy operators" and also
wrote a rude letter to the lawyer who sent the letter saying that he had
instructed his client "not to pay a penny and to put your insulting and
frankly stupid letter to the only use for which it might be suitable, however
uncomfortably." He also described the lawyer as a "bully" and suggested
that he had graduated "bottom of his class."'"' Laarakker was found
to have engaged in professional misconduct by reason of his incivility
and was reprimanded and fined. Laarakker later complained to the Law
Society of Upper Canada about the conduct of the lawyer who wrote the
demand letters, but the Law Society declined to take any action against
that lawyer.'3 2
By publicly identifying the legal invalidity of the claims made in the
demand letter, and by shaming the lawyer who sent it, Laarakker took
informal steps to help maintain the rule of law, steps that the law societies
themselves appear unwilling to take. It would have been more professional
to be polite, but politeness might have been less powerful. Moreover, while
Laarakker was not polite, he invoked no extra-legal mechanisms to get his
way. He offered neither threat nor violence.
What sort of lawyers do we want? Do we want lawyers who call out
other lawyers for misconduct? Or do we want lawyers who fail to do so
for fear that their criticisms will be sanctionable? Law societies may prefer
the latter; they may believe that the reputation of the profession will be
best preserved if lawyers act with decorum or silence in the face of other
lawyers' misbehaviour. But the argument here is that the only hope for
retaining public respect is if the public believes that lawyers and the legal
profession will protect them from wrongdoing by other lawyers through
formal regulation and through informal social sanctions like shaming and
shunning. The law societies should be rewarding the lawyers who have
the courage and determination to take on that task rather than sanctioning
them for their choice of words.
Conclusion
When my father was a boy he visited the office of his father's lawyer.
On the wall was a sign: "if all by law were right, and all by statute good,
131. Laarakker, supra note 13 at para 12.
132. Woolley, "Lawyers Regulating Lawyers (Redux)," supra note 129.
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I could not breathe the impeccable air, nor would I if I could."l33 The sign
was, I think, a plea for humility in our ambitions in law and as lawyers,
asking us to recognize that the law does not create human goodness,
that its attempts to perfect the world may do as much harm as good, and
that sometimes we simply have to live with and accept things about our
fellow citizens we might wish we could legislate away. It is the elegant
counterpoint to the claim, "there oughta be a law!"
Civility by lawyers to all those with whom they interact is generally
a good thing. But that does not deteriine whether regulation designed
to ensure civility, and to punish lawyers who are uncivil, is itself a social
good. To the extent that civility regulation helps identify and bring under
regulatory control lawyers who have a practice in ethical disarray, it
serves a useful purpose. Beyond that, however, civility regulation creates
significant problems by leading regulators to avoid or miss the ethical
complexity of legal practice, by unduly narrowing the conception of the
"good lawyer" and by creating disincentives for lawyers to do things they
ought to do. Law societies do not need to remove civility requirements
from their largely aspirational codes of conduct,1 4 and they may wish
to continue to promote the virtues of civility amongst their membership.
They should also, however, heed the warning of my grandfather's lawyer,
and be cautious when attempting to create through operation of law the
society and class of lawyers of which they dream.
133. Appropriately for a lawyer with farmer clients, there was also a picture of a cow with one
man pulling the horns, another man pulling the tail and a third man milking-the cow was labelled
"lawsuit" and the man milking was labeled "lawyer." The lawyer's name was David Hughes, and his
firm continues today with offices in North Wales and Cheshire: <http://www.allingtonhughes.co.uk/
allington-hughes-solicitors.php>.
134. As many commentators have noted, most provisions of the codes of conduct are never or rarely
enforced.

